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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHY FOOLS CHOOSE TO BE FOOLS: A LOOK AT WHAT
COMPELS INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO CHOOSE
SELF-REPRESENTATION
1

“You don’t have a name. You don’t have a face. You’re just another case.”

INTRODUCTION
This past summer, codefendants Tyrone Jackson and his girlfriend Madlon
Ladd faced a five-count federal felony drug indictment.2 Both were charged
for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.3 Both were deemed
indigent,4 lacking the resources to procure private attorneys, and thus entitled
to counsel paid for by the government.5 Ms. Ladd went to trial with a courtappointed attorney. Mr. Jackson, however, informed the trial court judge that
he wished to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, citing
After
dissatisfaction with his assigned federal public defender.6
acknowledging that Mr. Jackson had made his waiver of counsel both
knowingly and voluntarily, the judge allowed Mr. Jackson to represent
himself.7 After just over four days of trial, a jury found both defendants guilty.

1. Interview with Tyrone Jackson, Pro Se Defendant, in Belleville, Ill. (January 9, 2009)
(recording on file with the author).
2. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Jackson, No. 08-30003-WDS-DGW (S.D.Ill.,
July 8, 2008).
3. Id.
4. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (defining indigency as being
“financially unable to obtain an adequate representation”); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6
(1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (2007); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 44(a); ALAB. CODE. § 15-12-1(1)
(2007) (defining indigent as “financially unable to pay for his or her defense”); PA. R. CRIM. P.
122(A)(1) (2005) (discussing legal representation for “defendants who are without financial
resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel”).
5. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (providing that a poor criminal
defendant may have counsel provided by the state).
6. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
7. Minutes of Hearing Regarding Status of Counsel, United States v. Jackson, No. 08-CR30003-WDS (S.D.Ill., June 6, 2008) (“[The] Court advises the defendant that it would be in his
best interest to proceed to trial with an attorney and strongly advises the defendant not to proceed
to trial without counsel.”). Judge Stiehl, the district court judge, also appointed Rodney Holmes
as standby counsel for Mr. Jackson for the remainder of the proceedings. Minutes of Final
Pretrial Conference, United States v. Jackson, No. 08-CR-30003-WDS (S.D. Ill., June 18, 2008).
385
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There was never a sense that the trial was unfair or even that Mr. Jackson
did an inadequate job of representing himself.8 To the contrary, his knowledge
of the law, courtroom demeanor, and charismatic personality were all quite
remarkable. The evidence against him, however, was overwhelming. He
likely would have been convicted even with the assistance of counsel. That
being said, the intriguing question remains: what compelled Mr. Jackson to
proceed without the assistance of counsel? Did he believe he could do a better
job of presenting his case to a jury than a trained lawyer appointed by the
court? Or simply, did his distrust and disdain for the criminal justice system
cause him to refuse assistance from a social institution he perceived as unfair?
If so, does the court have an obligation to step in and dispel misunderstandings
that underlie the decisions of indigent criminal defendants, like Mr. Jackson, to
go pro se? This Comment seeks to gain an understanding of the incentives and
misconceptions that induce indigent criminal defendants like Mr. Jackson to
forgo their constitutional right to counsel at trial.9
It has long been said that one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a
client.10 Still, prosecutors and judges have recently experienced an influx of
indigent criminal defendants choosing pro se representation. In response,
some in the legal community have harshly criticized this trend.11 This
Comment contends that unless the legal profession changes its approach to
providing indigent defense counsel and designs more effective ways to handle
waiver-of-counsel inquiries, courts may find an even greater number of pro se
indigent defendants flooding their dockets.
Most commentators who are troubled by the inclination of indigent
defendants to choose self-representation base their criticisms on
unsubstantiated assumptions, suggesting that these defendants do an

8. This is based on the author’s experience in the district court for the Southern District of
Illinois during Mr. Jackson’s trial.
9. It is important to note that this Comment usually refers to “indigent criminal defendants”
as a single population. While this classification may suffer the same weaknesses of most
generalizations, it does not undermine the goal of this Comment, which is to gain an
understanding of what contributes to the decision for many indigent defendants to choose selfrepresentation.
10. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 438 (2007).
11. In the 2006 State of the Ohio Judiciary address, Chief Justice Moyer of the Ohio
Supreme Court expressed his irritation with the growing number of criminal defendants choosing
to represent themselves. Editorial, Eliminating the Pro Se Litigant, N. COUNTRY GAZETTE, Sept.
23, 2006, http://www.northcountrygazette.org/articles/092306ProSeLitigants.html; see also John
F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the
Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483,
489 (1996) (arguing that self-representation “undermines the integrity and efficiency of the
criminal justice system”).
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inadequate job of representing themselves.12 To the contrary, one empirical
study has shown that pro se felony defendants achieve acquittals at rates
equivalent or higher than those defendants with attorneys.13 In addition, nearly
80% of those individuals surveyed did not show any visible signs of mental
illness,14 dispelling the notion that anyone who chooses to waive counsel is
somehow chemically imbalanced.
Despite the statistical support
demonstrating that some indigent defendants are better off (or at least not
worse off) by going pro se, the legal profession should nevertheless strive to
dispel any misconceptions among defendants that proceeding to trial without
licensed counsel is advantageous.
For indigent defendants, perception may not always equate with reality.
Yet the concerns of these defendants are not beyond our understanding. This
Comment maintains that most indigent defendants make the decision as a last
resort to escape their feelings of helplessness. Those quick to criticize the
decision to go pro se are likely unwilling to recognize or address the root of
such a decision. Rather than condemning pro se representation, or calling for
the overturn of the Supreme Court’s finding of the right to selfrepresentation,15 this Comment examines what compels indigent criminal
defendants to choose pro se representation in the first place. Deficiencies in
the criminal justice system, both real and perceived, foster the desire and
understandable necessity for many indigent criminal defendants to represent
themselves. As such, this Comment questions whether our current system
fulfills its constitutional obligation to provide indigent criminal defendants
with proper representation in the event they accept court-appointed counsel.16
From there, this Comment will make recommendations for how the legal
profession can diminish the likelihood that indigent criminal defendants will
choose pro se representation.
To accomplish these ends, this Comment is broken into four segments.
Part I details the historical development of the right to proceed pro se,
beginning with an examination of the right to counsel, and continuing with a
discussion of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the constitutional guarantee
of the right to self-representation. Part II examines the current state of the

12. Hashimoto, supra note 10, at 438.
13. Id. at 423.
14. Id.
15. Former Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to
overturn Faretta, which conferred upon criminal defendants the right to self-representation. See
United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL
22697568 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-691); Egwaoje v. United States, 541 U.S. 958 (2004)
(denying cert.).
16. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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indigent defense system,17 showing how its shortcomings seemingly validate
the decision by many indigent defendants to proceed pro se. Part III addresses
the psychological or sociological factors that may compel indigent defendants,
like Tyrone Jackson, to refuse the assistance of counsel in favor of selfrepresentation. In accordance with the belief that pro se representation is not
the preferred course of action for indigent criminal defendants, Part IV will
recommend some normative policies designed to encourage indigent criminal
defendants to accept the assistance of counsel rather than choosing selfrepresentation.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL VS. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION
This section examines two important constitutional rights that arise from
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment: (1) the indigent
defendant’s right to counsel and (2) the right to self-representation.18 In
Gideon v. Wainwright,19 the Court granted indigent defendants the right to
counsel in all serious criminal matters,20 while in Faretta v. California,21 the
Court held that a defendant could waive that right and choose selfrepresentation.22 Although Gideon envisioned something akin to representation
for all, its implementation has done very little to bolster indigent defendants’
confidence in those attorneys assigned to their defense.23 As a result, some
indigent defendants choose to waive the right to counsel and exercise the right
of self-representation. Since Faretta’s conferral of the right to selfrepresentation, the careless administration of waiver-of-counsel inquiries by
trial courts has further facilitated the propensity of indigent defendants to
exercise their constitutionally protected right to self-representation.
A.

The Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants

Without the Gideon Court finding that the government has a constitutional
obligation to provide the assistance of counsel to indigent defendants in
criminal proceedings, discussion of whether such defendants should be

17. “Indigent defense system” encompasses both federal and state public defender offices
and court-appointed attorneys utilized by many courts. See, e.g., ALAB. CODE. § 15-12-1(5)
(describing indigent defense system as a “method or mixture of methods for providing legal
representation to an indigent defendant, including use of appointed counsel, use of contract
counsel, use of public defenders, or any other alternative method meeting constitutional
requirements”).
18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. 372 U.S. at 335.
20. Id. at 335.
21. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
22. Id. at 807.
23. See David A. Simon, Comment, Equal Before the Law: Toward a Restoration of
Gideon’s Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 582 (2008).
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allowed to proceed with pro se representation would be moot. Many would
simply have no choice but to represent themselves.
That was the predicament facing Clarence Earl Gideon. Charged with a
felony and lacking the financial means to procure a lawyer, Clarence Gideon
was forced to conduct his own defense.24 After providing the best defense that
“could be expected from a layman,”25 a jury convicted Mr. Gideon and
sentenced him to five years in prison.26 In a handwritten letter to the Justices
of the Supreme Court, Mr. Gideon pleaded for help.27 Analogizing the note to
a writ of certiorari, the Court decided to hear his case.28 The Court ultimately
held that the Constitution guarantees indigent defendants the right to counsel
when facing serious criminal charges, and such counsel must be paid for by the
state.29 Since then, however, states have struggled with the financial burden of
providing such representation.30
1.

If They Have No Say, Why Not Go Pro Se?

The right to counsel does not confer upon indigent criminal defendants any
right to the counsel of their choice.31 Further, the lack of sufficient safeguards
to protect such defendants from ineffective indigent defense counsel and the
inability to style a mode of defense to their liking also contributes to the
unwillingness to acquiesce to indigent defense counsel.32 It is this general lack
of choice which forces the hand of many indigent defendants to choose selfrepresentation when permitted to do so by trial courts.
a.

Lack of Choice Breeds Contempt: The System’s Disdain for Indigent
Defendants

In most cases, indigent criminal defendants do not choose their lawyers.33
Lacking financial means to procure a private attorney, some defendants may be
24. Id. at 581.
25. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
26. Simon, supra note 23, at 581.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. Gideon extended the right to counsel by including indigent
defendants in all cases, both federal and state. The Court had previously established that indigent
defendants have the right to the assistance of counsel in federal court cases. See Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
30. See infra Part II.
31. Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant:
Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the
Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 199 (1998); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
159 (1988) (“[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”).
32. “Indigent defense counsel” refers to both public defenders and private court-appointed
attorneys.
33. See Holly, supra note 31, at 199.
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fortunate enough to have a lawyer in the family or an acquaintance who is
willing to provide legal assistance. Perhaps in a widely publicized case, they
may garner the attention of an attorney who offers to take the case pro bono.
Yet these are options available to few indigent defendants, and in some
instances, the “family friends” and/or “pro-bono” lawyers referenced above
may lack the experience to handle serious criminal cases, potentially leaving
the defendant worse off. Most indigent defendants, therefore, are forced to
settle for the attorney appointed by the court or assigned by a local public
defender office. 34 Based on that spin of the roulette wheel, indigent criminal
defendants are stuck with attorneys whom they did not choose and, in many
cases, do not trust.
Nonindigent defendants choose lawyers with whom they hope they can
develop trust, and without that trust, “the relationship is indeed meaningless.”35
Such trust helps facilitate the notion that the attorney is advocating on behalf of
his client.36 Much of the rationale underlying the idea that nonindigent
defendants should be allowed to retain the counsel of their choice encompasses
constitutional ideals that should carry over to indigent defendants as well.37
Those include maintaining an adversarial system to ensure fairness in criminal
prosecutions, the right to free choice, and the preservation of individual
freedom.38 Yet for indigent criminal defendants, the power of selecting their
attorneys is vested in the sole discretion of the trial court or a local state or
federal public defenders’ office.39
The choice is made without any regard for the defendant’s preferences, and
courts make it extremely difficult for indigent defendants to replace attorneys
with whom they find no comfort. While making the decision to disregard a
defendant’s preferences when appointing counsel or in deferring to a public
defender’s office may provide judicial economy, it fails to instill the indigent
defendant with any faith in counsel. But in support of deferring to the trial
court’s determination of appointed counsel, some argue that judges are better
able to make the choice because they “know the abilities of the available local

34. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006).
35. Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 525, 527 (2007); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.2 (2009)
[hereinafter MRPC] (highlighting that “trust ‘is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship’”).
36. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]rust between attorney and client . . . is necessary for the attorney to be a truly
effective advocate.”); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[T]he most
important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.”).
37. Holly, supra note 31, at 200.
38. Id.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
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counsel,”40 and allowing defendants the choice will “disrupt the ‘even handed
distribution of assignments.’”41 Allowing defendants to choose counsel might
also enable repeat offenders to monopolize the best lawyers.42 Still, none of
these justifications erase reservations in the minds of many indigent defendants
regarding the level of protection their appointed counsel will provide.
Maybe it is a product of our country’s capitalist foundation, but people like
having choices, and we tend to react negatively when told we must do
something, or that we are stuck with a particular outcome. Human nature
compels us look for a way out of such situations, especially when our backs are
to the wall. Many indigent criminal defendants, already skeptical of a system
they perceive as unfair, are particularly concerned about being stuck with an
attorney assigned by a system they feel is designed to throw them in prison.43
For the indigent, the lines blur between the four arms of the criminal justice
system: (1) the judge, (2) the prosecutor, (3) the defense attorney, and (4) the
jury.44 So when a judge tells them that they must accept “lawyer X” as their
attorney, suspicion arises. Thus, the legal profession must determine how to
foster faith in the system.
b.

Difficulty in Substituting Counsel

In addition to lacking the initial choice of counsel, it is also extremely
difficult for indigent defendants to replace counsel once it has been assigned.
The defendant may obtain substitute counsel only upon a showing of “good
cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication,
or an irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust
verdict.”45 Courts have concluded that even a good-faith lack of confidence by
a defendant in his attorney does not establish sufficient “good cause” to allow
for replacement of counsel.46 More often than not, courts refuse additional
substitutes, leaving many indigent defendants with a choice between the lesser
of two perceived evils: accepting indigent defense counsel or going pro se.47

40. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(a), at 550 (1999) (quoting
Peter W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79
(1974)).
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1979)).
42. Id. at 551.
43. See Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
44. See infra Part III.
45. 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 40, at 555 (quoting McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.
1981)).
46. Id. at 555.
47. Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2006) (“[T]he courts should be more receptive when an indigent
defendant who is not satisfied with the representation by assigned counsel moves to substitute
counsel.”).
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Probably the greatest impediment to success on a motion to substitute
counsel is that blame for any friction in the current attorney–client relationship
is automatically attributed to the indigent defendant.48 The boy who cries wolf
(in the form of an indigent defendant who chronically demands different
lawyers) diminishes the likelihood that an indigent defendant’s legitimate
concerns about his attorney’s ability to represent him will be properly
addressed.49 In many instances, “Defendants not only are given bad lawyers,
they are tethered to them because defendant have no right to replace even the
most incompetent and unsympathetic lawyer.”50 It is that tetherball cord that
indigent defendants snap when they elect to go pro se, hoping that somehow
self-representation enables them to present a more compelling case to a jury.
c.

No Right to Meaningful Representation

It is not unreasonable for indigent defendants to believe that the system
does not care about them. In fact, Chief Justice Burger stated in Morris v.
Slappy,51 that the Supreme Court “reject[s] the claim that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and
his counsel.”52 How can an indigent defendant ever develop trust with
someone with whom they are guaranteed no meaningful relationship? The
Court’s language does little to foster confidence in indigent defense counsel.
For most indigent defendants, the right to counsel of choice is already “a right
that is nonexistent” for them.53 Slappy goes further and refuses an indigent
defendant’s right to retain counsel that they may have developed a positive
rapport with during a prior case.54 Allowing indigent defendants to keep an
attorney that they trust would potentially dissuade some of them from electing
pro se representation. Regardless of the inherent difficulties in implementing
such a scheme, courts should try to furnish attorneys for indigent defendants
with whom they have a positive preexisting relationship.55

48. See, e.g., Douglas v. Warden, 591 A.2d 399, 405 (1991) (“Our courts are not, however,
constitutionally required to comply with a demand for the appointment of a replacement counsel
on the basis of a purported conflict that arises from the unreasonable conduct of the accused
himself.”).
49. Id. at 406.
50. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 253–54 (2006).
51. 461 U.S. 13 (1983).
52. Id. at 14 (emphasis added); see also Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 539 (“Chief Justice
Burger . . . scoffed at the notion that the Sixth Amendment contains a right to a meaningful
attorney-client relationship.”).
53. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526.
54. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 12–13.
55. See Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 549 (“[G]iven the importance of trust, autonomy, and
fairness to the right to counsel of choice, the court should appoint the same attorney to represent
an indigent defendant in his subsequent cases, if the defendant so chooses.”).
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The more recent decision in Gonzalez–Lopez56 may indicate the Court’s
willingness to allow for a more meaningful relationship between indigent
defendants and their attorneys. Justice Scalia suggested in his opinion, that for
a trial to be truly fair, the accused should “be defended by the counsel he
believes to be the best.”57 While the “trial court’s wide latitude in balancing
the right to counsel of choice . . . against the demands of its calendar”
precludes the Court from allowing the right to counsel of choice for indigent
defendants,58 Professor Janet Hoeffel sees hope in Scalia’s opinion.59 She feels
that by disaggregating the right to counsel of choice from the “mere effective
assistance of counsel, Justice Scalia gives the issue new life,”60 possibly
allowing greater expansion into the indigent’s ability to choose counsel.61
d.

Lack of Control Over Decision-Making

Not only are indigent defendants left with an attorney they did not choose,
they also have little control over the decision-making responsibilities regarding
how their case should be handled. Courts have traditionally found that defense
counsel controls the tactical and strategic decision-making in a case.62 Distrust
for counsel is thus only compounded when a defendant is unable to put forth
the sort of defense he or she prefers. From there, the option of pro se
representation may be seen as the only viable way of presenting a defense that
adheres to the desires of the indigent defendant, particularly given the
unwillingness of courts to allow indigent defendants to substitute counsel with
whom they disagree.63
Lawyers have an obligation to consult with their clients in order to
investigate possible defenses and to keep their client informed regarding
developments of a pending case.64 Disagreements between a lawyer and a

56. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id. at 152.
59. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 548.
60. Id.
61. See infra Part IV.
62. Poulin, supra note 47, at 1239; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). In discussing the authority of defense counsel, Justice Burger stated:
Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the
attorney. He, not the client, has the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if
and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. Not
only do these decisions rest with the attorney, but such decisions must, as a practical
matter be made without consulting the client.
Id. (emphasis added).
63. See Poulin, supra note 47, at 1236 (“Only by electing to proceed pro se can the
defendant assert control over the myriad tactical and strategic decisions that must be made in the
course of any criminal case.”).
64. See MRPC, supra note 35, at R. 1.4(a)–(b).
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client, however, are more prone to arise when a defendant distrusts his or her
lawyer.65 Many choosing self-representation find the “sharing of authority
with lawyers as intolerable.”66 Thus, when an indigent defendant chooses to
proceed pro se, “the problem of conflict between lawyer and client
disappears.”67
2.

Weak Protection from Ineffective Counsel

Indigent defendants who choose to waive their right to counsel and
proceed with pro se representation also forego the opportunity to appeal their
convictions on grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel.68 At first glance, this
could be seen as relinquishing a substantial right, and makes the decision to go
pro se seem even more foolish since courts are supposed to protect indigent
defendants from ineffective counsel. Yet the legal standards defining
“effective counsel” are satisfied by “the most minimal competence” from
attorneys.69 Incidents of what seem like grossly improper conduct have been
held to meet the standard of effective counsel by courts. Not only may
“overworked and incompetent” attorneys from a public defender’s office lead
to “wrongful convictions,”70 but judges have sometimes condoned the conduct
of private court-appointed lawyers who were unaware of applicable governing
law and even those who have been intoxicated and/or asleep during trial.71
In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for
determining the effectiveness of the assistance of counsel in criminal
proceedings.72 Under this “cramped definition” of effective counsel,73 a
criminal defendant must not only prove that counsel was deficient in his
performance, but that the deficiency was a “but-for” cause of the outcome of
the proceedings, i.e., a guilty verdict.74 Such a standard has been difficult for

65. Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: Self-Inflicted Injustice or LawyerInflicted Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39, 44–45 (2004).
66. Id. at 45.
67. Id. at 44.
68. Sarah Livingston Allen, Note, Faretta: Self-Representation, or Legal-Misrepresentation,
90 IOWA L. REV. 1553, 1564 (2005) (stating that pro se defendants may not appeal their
convictions “based on the quality of the defense that they provide for themselves”); see also
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[A] defendant who elects to represent
himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of
‘effective assistance of counsel.’”).
69. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526.
70. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006).
71. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 785–86 (1997).
72. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
73. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526.
74. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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indigent defendants to overcome when appealing convictions on
ineffectiveness of counsel grounds,75 particularly since it fails to address the
financial shortcomings that inevitably lead to ineffective counsel.76 Moreover,
the cavalier manner with which appellate courts have dismissed ineffective
counsel appeals is troubling. For instance, in more than 100 cases, the Sixth
Circuit rejected such challenges by “issuing single-sentence orders that lacked
explanation.”77 Additionally, other appellate courts have gone out of their way
to rationalize the reprehensible conduct of counsel.78
Roberto Miranda found out the hard way that courts often provide very
little protection from ineffective counsel.79 Mr. Miranda was charged with
several felonies, including first-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon,
and larceny.80 His court-appointed public defender only recently had
graduated from law school and had never handled a murder trial.81 On trial for
his life, Mr. Miranda’s attorney failed to serve a subpoena on any of the forty
people his client claimed could provide him with an alibi.82 Failure to
investigate such a lynchpin matter ultimately contributed to Mr. Miranda’s
conviction and subsequent death sentence.83 Such stories leave little assurance
to defendants concerned about the quality of representation they will receive
from indigent defense counsel. It is reasonable to expect that some indigent
defendants would feel uncomfortable with counsel they do not choose and
have difficulty replacing.

75. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986);
Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2004).
76. Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2005). The approach established in Strickland
concerns only the end result rather than taking into account the detrimental effect on the quality
of representation, which can result from an under funded and over worked public defender. Id.
77. Fredric N. Tulsky, The High Cost of a Bad Defense, THE SAN JOSE MERCURY-NEWS,
Jan. 24, 2006, at A1.
78. See id. In one case, the court “suggested that an alcoholic lawyer’s repeated absences
and tardiness during trial may have been a knowing tactic to permit him time to sober up before
the jury saw him.” Id.
79. See Miranda v. Clark County, 279 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2002).
80. Id. at 1105; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 70, at 1034.
81. Miranda, 279 F.3d at 1105.
82. Id.
83. Id. Mr. Miranda’s conviction was ultimately overturned, and he received a settlement
from Clark County for $5 million in a lawsuit alleging a failure to provide adequate
representation. Carri Greer Thevenot, Settlement Ends Ex-Inmate’s Saga, LAS VEGAS REV. J.,
June 30, 2004, at 1A.
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Constitutional Right to Proceed Pro Se

Even with the constitutional right to counsel in serious criminal matters,
indigent defendants who complain about their treatment may be greeted by the
old adage, “beggars can’t be choosers.” Rather than be perceived as a beggar,
perpetually dissatisfied with assistance provided by the government, some
indigent defendants understandably choose to waive the right to such counsel
and proceed pro se.
Prior to 1976, there had never been reason for the Court to consider the
issue of whether an indigent defendant could waive the constitutional right of
counsel established in Gideon and choose self-representation.84 Then,
Anthony Faretta, an indigent man who refused to settle for court-appointed
defense counsel whom he deemed unfit to represent his interests,85 posed the
then-novel question: Did Gideon mean that indigent defendants are required to
accept court-appointed counsel for their defense?86 The Supreme Court said
no.87 Since then, however, courts have struggled with how to administer
waiver of counsel inquiries in a way that ensures indigent defendants enter pro
se representation with their “eyes open.”88
1.

The Supreme Court Grants the Right of Self-Representation

In Faretta, the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a state may
force a lawyer onto a criminal defendant who desires to represent himself.89
The Court found it unconstitutional to do so, and that free choice in the form of
self-representation should prevail.90 The Court found that such a right was
implied by the Sixth Amendment,91 relying on the language suggesting that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel . . . .”92 The majority of the Court interpreted “the
assistance of counsel” clause to mean that a defendant has the right to the aid
of counsel, but not that the state may impose such counsel on an unwilling
defendant.93 The Court took the position that since “the defendant, and not his

84. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1976).
85. Id. At trial, Mr. Faretta “did not want to be represented by the public defender because
he believed that that office was ‘very loaded down with . . . a heavy case load.’” Id.
86. Id. at 833–34.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
89. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.
90. Id. at 834.
91. Id. at 819 (“[T]he right to self-representation . . . is thus necessarily implied by the
structure of the [Sixth] Amendment.”).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
93. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819.
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lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction,” the
defendant should be allowed to make the ultimate determination.94
The majority in Faretta believed that the Framers of the Constitution
conceived the right to counsel as an optional means of defending oneself, not a
mandate.95 As such, this ruling may be seen as a vote of confidence to indigent
defendants—that the Constitution has faith in their ability to conduct their own
defense in the event they choose to do so.96 People take great pride in rights
given to them under the Constitution. For indigent defendants facing criminal
prosecution and potential prison time, clinging to such rights may amount to
their last hope.97 Logically, many of those same defendants would seem more
inclined to exercise those rights in order to flex their constitutional muscle at a
system they perceive as unfair.
2.

Critics of Faretta Share Sentiments with Those Concerned About Pro
Se Trend

Those critical of the holding in Faretta argue that more is at stake than the
self-indulgent interests of the criminal defendant.98 Perhaps society has a stake
in ensuring the appearance of propriety in our criminal justice system.99 Chief
Justice Burger, in his dissenting, and seemingly disgruntled, Faretta opinion,
dismissed the notion that “the quality of . . . representation at trial is a matter
with which only the accused is legitimately concerned.”100 The dissent would
instead grant greater deference to the trial court in assessing whether the
accused is sufficiently capable of conducting his or her defense.101 The dissent
maintained that the integrity of the criminal justice system is undermined when

94. Id. at 834.
95. Id. at 832 (“[T]he colonists and the Framers . . . always conceived of the right to counsel
as an ‘assistance’ for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself.”). The Court
was also very careful not to underestimate the value of a lawyer for a defendant in a criminal
proceeding. Id.
96. See id. at 834 (stating that the Founders would have thought the idea of a forced lawyer
untenable).
97. See id. at 834–35 (recognizing that the Founders understood the value of freedom of
choice).
98. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Nor is it accurate to suggest . . . that
the quality of representation at trial is a matter with which only accused is legitimately
concerned.”).
99. Id. (“[The] goal [of justice] . . . in every criminal trial . . . is ill-served, and the integrity
of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due
to the defendant’s ill-advised decision to waive counsel.”).
100. Id. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the criminal justice system “should not
be available as an instrument of self-destruction”); see also Johnson, supra note 65, at 41–42
(“Many besides the defendant suffer when courts wrongfully convict or condemn, and our
adversary system relies on the presentation of the best defense . . . .”).
101. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840.
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we allow defendants to waive counsel and proceed with pro se
representation.102 This coincides with contemporary commentators who are
alarmed by an increasing trend among indigent criminal defendants to select
self-representation.103
3.

Strengthening the Trial Court’s Discretion: Waiver of Counsel
Inquiries and the Relative Ease with Which Indigent Defendants Are
Enabled to Go Pro Se

Following Faretta, procedural safeguards intended to ensure the
appearance of propriety in criminal prosecutions (and ease the concerns of the
dissenters in Faretta) have been loosely implemented by trial courts. More
specifically, courts have failed to exercise the sort of discretion allowed by the
Court when deciding whether to allow indigent defendants to proceed pro se.
The reluctance of trial courts to assert their ascendancy over indigent
defendants has undoubtedly contributed to the rise in pro se representation.
This article contends that one of the reasons so many indigent defendants opt
to go pro se is that the decision can be made far too hastily. As such, courts
have an obligation to step in and try to dissuade or, at a minimum, slow down
indigent defendants who motion to waive their right to counsel and proceed
pro se.
The right to self-representation has never been held to be absolute, nor is it
guaranteed throughout the entirety of proceedings.104 The majority in Faretta
stated several grounds for denying a defendant the right to proceed pro se or to
discontinue his self-representation once the trial has commenced.105 First, the
defendant must make the request to proceed pro se in advance of trial to avoid
disruption of scheduled proceedings.106 Typically, the motion must be made
sometime before trial, and the trial court has broad discretion to reject what is
perceives as untimely motions.107 Second, the trial court will not tolerate a pro
se defendant who “engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”108
These goals of the Faretta inquiry, however, serve to promote judicial
economy and the avoidance of a filibustering pro se defendant.109 They are not
necessarily intended to serve the indigent defendant’s best interests.

102. Id. at 839. Chief Justice Burger surely would be even more distraught over indigent
defendants choosing self-representation because of their presumably lesser degree of intelligence.
103. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
104. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
105. See id.
106. See id. (stating that the decision to go pro se is not “a license not to comply with relevant
rules of procedural . . . law”). The Court also mentions with approval that Faretta’s request was
made “weeks before trial.” Id. at 835.
107. Id.; see also United States v. Young, 287 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2002).
108. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46.
109. Id.
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More relevant to this discussion is that courts seem to have considerable
discretion in determining whether the defendant fully appreciates the choice of
self-representation and its potential risks, but often neglect to exercise such
power.110 This judicial complacency only contributes to the rise of indigent
defendants choosing pro se representation. A more stern approach is necessary
to curtail this trend. Currently, the inquiry into whether the defendant grasps
the magnitude of the decision to proceed pro se only hinges on whether the
defendant has knowingly and intelligently relinquished the benefits of
representation by counsel.111 Some courts begin with what has been coined the
Von Moltke inquiry, which obligates the trial court to assess whether the
defendant is making an informed decision to proceed pro se.112 For a waiver of
counsel to be valid under that standard, the defendant must make such a waiver
intelligently. As the court stated, the defendant must possess:
[A]n apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included
within in them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
113
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.

The Von Moltke inquiry stems from a case where the defendant waived counsel
and then pleaded guilty.114 In cases where the defendant seeks to go further
and elect self-representation at trial, the additional Faretta inquiry is necessary.
Faretta only states that the defendant “should be made aware of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . so that . . . ‘his choice is
made with eyes open.’”115 Faretta does not specifically require the court to
warn indigent criminal defendants about the potential pitfalls of selfrepresentation, nor does it require the court to point out the latent benefits of
representation from counsel.116 Over the years, courts have struggled with how

110. See Michael J. Kelly, Note, Making Faretta v. California Work Properly: Observations
and Proposals for Administration of Waiver of Counsel Inquiries, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 245, 279–80 (2005).
111. A person charged with a felony in a state court has an unconditional and absolute
constitutional right to a lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). This right
attaches at the pleading stage of the criminal process. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788–89
(1945). It may be waived only by voluntary and knowing action. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 465 (1938).
112. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948).
113. Id. at 724.
114. Id. at 709.
115. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
116. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 271–72 (discussing various interpretations of the waiver
requirement among the circuits, and emphasizing the difference between ‘should’ and ‘must’).
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to conduct waiver-of-counsel inquiries under the amorphous dictum of
Faretta.117
Whether Faretta’s insistence that defendants “should” be made aware of
the dangers of self-representation requires that trial courts provide an explicit
warning to defendants prior to allowing them to elect self-representation has
been the subject of much debate.118 All courts seem to recognize that the dicta
in Faretta asks trial courts to strike a delicate balance between: 1) serving as a
counselor to defendants by advising them of the potential pitfalls of selfrepresentation, and 2) overemphasis of the disadvantages of selfrepresentation, thereby scaring an otherwise pro se prone defendant into
acquiescing to court-appointed counsel.119 Regarding these concerns, Judge
Posner of the Seventh Circuit issued a warning: “If a judge exaggerates the
advantages of being represented or the disadvantages of self-representation, he
will be accused of having put his thumb on the scale and prevent[ing] the
defendant from making an informed choice.”120 Posner feels that a judge
should take responsibility for the defendant’s awareness of his rights.121 With
respect to indigent criminal defendants, Posner’s take on the limited discretion
that should be exercised by lower courts during waiver-of-counsel inquiries
seems inconsistent with the sort of paternal protections the American
government is accustomed to providing the indigent in matters of critical
importance.
Albeit not its job to act as advisor to every defendant who enters the
courtroom without the assistance of counsel, the judge plays a key role in the
propensity of indigent defendants choosing to go pro se. In particular, judges
who neglect to dispel misunderstandings that compel many indigent defendants
to choose self-representation abandon their duty to ensure that such defendants
elect pro se representation with “eyes open,” as the Constitution requires.122
This Comment recommends a more thorough waiver-of-counsel to encourage
courts to act in a paternal role when dealing with indigent defendants. The
lack of oversight when dealing with this group has undoubtedly led not only to
the inclination, but the ability of indigent defendants to choose selfrepresentation. While, perhaps, a court should not be obligated to issue an

117. See United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring the trial judge to
ask the defendant a list of thirteen questions from a Bench Book for United States District
Judges); United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the trial judge
must “insure that [the defendant] understands 1) the nature of the charges against him; 2) the
possible penalties; and 3) ‘the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’”)).
118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
119. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 263–65, 276.
120. Id. at 276 (quoting United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2001)).
121. Id. (quoting Oreye, 263 F.3d at 672).
122. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
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explicit warning about the potential pitfalls of self-representation to indigent
defendants, the court should sternly advise the defendant about the gravity of
the decision and have the discretion to prohibit such a move when made on
largely irrational grounds.
The less than well-to-do of American society (i.e. those qualifying as
would-be indigent criminal defendants) often receive greater paternalistic
supervision from the U.S. government,123 and there seems like no more
suitable circumstance to perpetuate that control than when their liberty hangs
in the balance. In addition to the sentiments of Chief Justice Burger’s dissent
in Faretta, trial courts should be given greater discretion during waiver of
counsel inquiries,124 particularly when an indigent defendant chooses to go pro
se based on concerns about the counsel assigned to represent him.125 A stern
role for judges presiding over the decision to proceed at trial seems necessary
for several reasons. First, more is at stake when an indigent defendant decides
to commence to trial rather than accept a plea bargain (usually for significantly
less jail time) in the early stages of proceedings.126 Second, indigent
defendants electing pro se representation at trial may have distorted ideas about
what the experience will be like: defenses they will be able to assert, things
they can say, etc.127 Judges should seize the opportunity to clear up any
misconceptions that the defendant may have about going pro se.
During waiver-of-counsel inquiries, many courts make use of the totality
of circumstances approach rather than any sort of formulated test.128 This
approach seems most appropriate for determining whether an indigent
defendant is truly making the decision to go pro se with “eyes open,” because
it allows the judge flexibility in determining whether the defendant appreciates
the gravity of the decision.129 This allows the court to investigate concerns the
indigent defendant may have regarding his attorney’s ability to conduct his
defense.130 Yet, many courts fail to take advantage of this opportunity to

123. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 10–11
(6th ed. 2006) (“[Paternalistic regulations] are at least partly justified on the grounds that
government has a certain obligation to protect individuals from their own confusion and
irresponsibility.”).
124. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he trial judge is in the best
position to determine whether the accused is capable of conducting his defense.”).
125. See Klein, supra note 75, at 663–73 (providing an overview of conditions associated
with representation by a public defender).
126. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 274.
127. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1. Mr. Jackson was under the impression that he
would be able to say and do things at trial that he otherwise would not have been able to do unless
afforded the opportunity to represent himself.
128. Kelly, supra note 110, at 263, 266–69.
129. Id. at 264.
130. Id. at 266.
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dissuade a defendant from proceeding pro se or, at least, discover the basis of
that decision.131
This is not to say that trial courts should never allow an indigent defendant
to waive his right to counsel when the defendant truly believes that selfrepresentation is his best course of action. But the court should only allow the
waiver after it has engaged in a discussion to determine the basis for the
defendant’s decision. While a formal warning may not be required,132 the
court should have discretion to intervene and override free choice when an
indigent defendant makes an irrational decision to proceed pro se. This is
especially so when the qualifications of appointed counsel is balanced against
the borderline competency of the defendant to conduct his own defense.
Prudence should allow for an indigent defendant to understand not only the
risks of self-representation, but to be informed of the possible benefits of
acquiescing to indigent defense counsel. Many defendants may fail to grasp
exactly what level of defense they will receive from indigent defense counsel.
For instance, a highly-respected attorney with the Federal Public Defender’s
Office for the Southern District of Illinois was the appointed attorney for
Tyrone Jackson in his case. Federal public defenders have significantly lighter
case loads than most state public defenders,133 and thus Mr. Jackson’s attorney
would not have been so hindered by a crushing workload that might diminish
his ability to serve Mr. Jackson. But perhaps hearing about the incidences of
overwhelming caseloads in public defender offices,134 Mr. Jackson was
improperly influenced by that stereotype into dismissing his attorney.
Another factor at the heart of Mr. Jackson’s decision to proceed pro se was
that he was upset because his public defender never asked him whether or not
he was innocent or guilty before going forward with his case.135 What
defendants like Mr. Jackson fail to realize is that it is actually in the client’s
best interest that attorneys not pry into the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
According to Tom Flynn, a federal public defender for the Eastern District of
Missouri, when criminal defense attorneys first meet their clients, they don’t
say, “Johnny, did you do it?”136 If they do that and the client says, “‘Yeah, I
did it,’ then that precludes [the attorney] from putting [the defendant] on the

131. Interview with Thomas Flynn & Kevin Curran, Federal Public Defenders for the Eastern
District of Missouri, in St. Louis, Missouri. (Jan. 22, 2009). Kevin Curran believes that courts are
mistaken in failing to discuss with indigent defendants why exactly they are making the decision
to proceed pro se. Id. Many judges concern themselves with the defendant’s behavior or mental
state rather than asking about the attorney’s conduct which may underlie the defendant’s decision.
Id.
132. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 254–57.
133. Interview with Flynn & Curran, supra note 131.
134. See infra Part II.
135. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
136. Interview with Flynn & Curran, supra note 131.
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witness stand to say he didn’t do it, because then [we would] be knowingly
suborning perjury.”137 During the waiver of counsel discussion, a judge could
clear up such idiosyncrasies of the process that indigent defendants may not
understand.
It must be noted that some defendants elect to proceed to pro se after they
become legitimately dissatisfied with their appointed indigent defense counsel
and realize that substitute counsel is not a viable option.138 Perhaps the court
conducting a more substantial inquiry into why that particular lawyer is
unsatisfactory may help legitimize the court’s willingness to allow the
defendant to waive the right to counsel. This also provides the trial judge an
opportunity to refute the defendant’s assertions about his counsel by, for
instance, citing that attorney’s qualifications for handling the case.
If one of the underlying reasons for granting discretion to trial courts in
choosing counsel for indigent defendants is because they know local attorneys
best,139 then when a defendant makes a motion to go pro se, the trial judge
should be obligated to make a good-faith argument to the indigent defendant as
to why he should retain his attorney. Or, in the event that the lawyer is from a
locally funded public defender office, someone with persuasive candor should
be called on to speak to the capabilities of that individual. Perhaps then, the
defendant will reconsider his pro se decision in light of such an endorsement.
If his failure to recognize the value of such assistance persists, the court should
have the discretion to refuse a waiver that is irrational and arguably lacks
intelligence.
II. INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS IN AMERICA INFLUENCES THE DECISION TO
WAIVE COUNSEL
The Supreme Court has voiced its disapproval of indigent defendants who
waive their right to counsel: “Our experience has taught us that ‘a pro se
defense is usually a bad defense, particularly compared with a defense
provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.’”140 Yet, such skill
allegedly possessed by public defenders and court-appointed counsel does not
always translate into the sort of compassionate counsel that so many indigent
defendants desire.141 If society equates the appearance of justice in criminal
137. Id.
138. See supra Part I.A.1.b.
139. See supra text accompanying note 34.
140. Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (quoting Decker, supra
note 11, at 598).
141. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for
All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 105 (1993) (quoting United States v. Ely,
719 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing why “[t]he best criminal lawyers who accept
appointments” might still provide indigent defendants unsatisfactory representation)). See also
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prosecutions with the indigent receiving representation by counsel, then
society must address the shortfalls of the indigent defense counsel system and
realize that an attorney may not always be more adept at handling a case than
an indigent defendant representing himself.142
A.

A Broken System for the Indigent Defendant

Most public defenders work for little pay and little gratitude, and many
court-appointed attorneys are too distracted by their own private practices to
care about indigent criminal cases assigned to them by local courts.143 If
assistance from indigent defense counsel can be shown, in certain instances, to
be only marginally better than self-representation, then why should we be
surprised by an indigent defendant who chooses to proceed pro se?
In the area of indigent criminal defense, one of the harshest critics of our
criminal justice system has been Stephen Bright, a defense attorney and
Professor of Law at Yale University.144 Over the years, he has fought to
strengthen the indigent defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, and has
often painted a picture of exactly why some defendants would choose to forego
representation.145 Bright has criticized jurisdictions that overwork their public
defenders and utilize incompetent local attorneys as court-appointed counsel.
Bright notes:
We’re seeing court systems that are run about like a fast food restaurant. A
fast food restaurant may be a little better, because at least there [are] some
choices and a menu there for the customers. But people are processed through
court not understanding what’s happening to them, with no investigation by the
lawyer, no understanding of who they are, when they’re sentenced. They’re
146
just processed through the system.

Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at
A1 (discussing how the time constraints caused by excessive case loads hinder public defenders
from providing each indigent defendant with the appropriate representation).
142. To reiterate, the phrase “indigent defense counsel” is a broad term encompassing both
lawyers from public defender offices and private attorneys appointed by the courts to represent
indigent defendants.
143. See Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Frontline]
(interviewing Stephen Bright, President and Senior Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights);
Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 543.
144. Bright also serves as President and Senior Counsel for the Southern Center for Human
Rights. The Law Office of the Southern Center for Human Rights, Who We Are,
http://www.schr.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
145. See Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 71; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE
L.J. 1835 (1994).
146. Frontline, supra note 143.
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Bright also reiterates: “Our courts have such a large volume of cases and
so little resources devoted to providing representation to people accused of
crimes, that this sort of fast food justice is what we’ve ended up with.”147 This
sort of “McJustice” may not only deter poor criminal defendants from wanting
to accept indigent defense counsel, but it also undermines the constitutional
right to counsel.148
Case loads have become so heavy for public defender offices that some
jurisdictions have elected to stop using their services.149 A judge in MiamiDade County recently ruled that the court would stop sending lesser felony
cases to the region’s public defender’s office until the situation imposing a
“crushing caseload” on the office had improved.150 The judge cited budget
problems as chief cause for this shortage of public defenders.151 Further, many
court-appointed attorneys believe that budget cuts and soaring case loads have
pushed them to the brink.152 In fact, the situation has become so dire that
“[public defenders] can’t ethically handle this many cases.”153 As a result, the
“quality of public defense” everywhere “is absolutely deteriorating.”154
With such turmoil in the criminal justice system, it is no wonder that so
many indigent defendants have grown to distrust the system. To some, selfrepresentation is perceived as the most viable option to avoid
misrepresentation. As J. Marty Robinson, head of the Missouri public
defender office put it, “If you’re providing [just] a warm body, you’re
providing meaningless representation to everyone.”155 Indigent defendants
demand and deserve more than just a warm body when their freedom is at
stake, and the hot-bloodedness that results from criminal prosecution likely
prompts some of them to take matters into their own hands in the form of selfrepresentation.

147. Id.
148. Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1 (discussing how lawyers in Michigan joke about the
“McJustice” in their state, while in New York, lawyers “make dark jokes about the plea bargain
‘assembly line’”).
149. See, e.g., Robert Patrick, Public Defender Rules Are Set to Change: Lawyers Say It’s
Unethical to Represent Some with So Little Time to Prepare, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 3,
2005, at E1; Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1.
150. Curt Anderson, Public Defenders Make Drastic Proposals Amid Cuts, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, July 17, 2008, at A1. Circuit Judge Stanford Blake believes that “evidence shows
that the number of active cases is so high that the assistant public defenders are, at best, providing
minimal competent representation to the accused.” Id. See also Patrick, supra note 149, at E1.
151. Anderson, supra note 150.
152. Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1.
153. Id. (quoting David J. Carroll, Director of Research for the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association).
154. Id. (quoting Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law).
155. Donna Walter, Missouri’s Public Defender Caseload Reductions to Begin, KANSAS CITY
DAILY NEWS-PRESS, June 23, 2008, at A1.
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Probably the greatest challenge facing jurisdictions that are strapped for
funding is persuading the public to contribute more financial support to
indigent criminal defense programs. Indigent criminal defendants are
politically unpopular.156 So mustering up financial or political capital to fix the
problems facing those individuals is difficult to accomplish through the
legislature.157 This leaves the courts to create a remedy.158 This Comment
does not purport to call for sweeping reforms in the funding of indigent
criminal defense systems; plenty of work has been done on that topic.159
Rather, this Comment suggests potential ways to alleviate concerns held by
indigent criminal defendants with regard to the level of representation they will
receive from court appointed defenders. Frankly, it seems unlikely that such
reform will ever come about. As such, it is up to the courts and members of
the legal profession to figure out a way to combat the indigent defense counsel
crisis.
B.

Resisting the Pressure to Plead

One of the outcomes of a criminal justice system overwhelmed by
caseloads is a necessity for criminal prosecutions to end in quick plea bargains.
Everyone involved in the criminal justice process, less the indigent defendant
who maintains his innocence, has an interest in seeing that a case not to go to
trial.160 In particular, there is substantial pressure on both prosecutors and
indigent defense counsel to convince defendants to take deals for lesser
offenses in order to avoid the time and expense of trials.161 This only helps
facilitate the notion held by many indigent defendants that their attorneys are
playing an integral part in a “system” that is trying to lock him up.
Admittedly, in cases where an indigent defendant is guilty of a crime and
may take a lesser sentence by avoiding trial, this is probably in his or her best
interest. But when pro se defendants considering pro se representation

156. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 76, at 1731–32 (“Due to the political unpopularity of
criminal defendants and their lack of financial and political capital, state legislatures are unlikely
to allocate significant attention or resources to the problem indigent defense, leaving courts with
the task of creating a constitutionally mandated remedy.”); see also, Editorial, Hard Times and
the Right to Counsel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at E1 (“With states struggling to come up with
financing for schools and hospitals, we fear politicians are unlikely to argue for significantly more
money for public defenders’ offices.”).
157. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 76, at 1731–32.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Backus & Marcus, supra note 70, at 1046 (examining the “broader impact of
inadequate funding, excessive public defender caseloads and insufficient salaries and
compensation for defense lawyers”); see also Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 141, at 73.
160. See Eckholm, supra note 141 (noting the overwhelming prevalence of plea bargaining
and the pressure on defendants to plead guilty when it may not be in their best interest).
161. See id.
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staunchly profess their innocence, and are unwilling to take any sort of deal,
the pressure put on them by their appointed attorney to plead only entrenches
the notion that the system is against them and that their best option is to go it
alone.
“One of the reasons that so many people plead guilty is because they really
don’t have legal representation,” which Bright attributes to large case volumes
and insufficient resources.162 This is particularly true with regards to many
private court-appointed attorneys, who have a contract with the court to handle
all cases that come their way for a flat fee.163 In such scenarios, there is “a
built-in conflict of interest” because of the attorney’s incentive to spend more
time on cases earning them money in their private practice.164 Other
defendants choose to plead to crimes they did not commit or to charges that are
beyond the scope of their crime for fear that a conviction will lead to
substantially longer jail time.165 As former Attorney General Janet Reno put it,
“a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful conviction.”166 In the
minds of many indigent defendants, however, a “good lawyer” is hardly an
option.167 Under that pretense, the decision to go pro se seems to stem more
from fear and the need to resist the pressure to plead rather than one based on
true reflection. At a minimum, by going pro se, some indigent defendants will
evade the pressure to plead.
III. MAKING THE DECISION TO PROCEED PRO SE
There are a host of reasons why some criminal defendants choose selfrepresentation. For many indigent defendants, however, the decision hinges on
their distrust of the legal system, which cannot be helped by the increasing
deterioration of the criminal defense system. Moreover, being poor only
intensifies the “feelings of alienation and powerlessness” when facing criminal
prosecution.168 Other indigent defendants may choose pro se representation for
strategic reasons, perhaps persuaded by the ability to cross-examine their
accusers, hopes of establishing a “better rapport with jurors,” and the chance to

162. Frontline, supra note 143.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1154 (2005).
166. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A CONFERENCE
REPORT, at vi (2000) (quoting Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the National Symposium
on Indigent Defense (June 29, 2000)).
167. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 71, at 784–85.
168. Kenneth P. Troccoli, “I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me”: Addressing a Black
Defendant’s Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW & INEQ. 1,
20 (2002).
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bargain for “greater latitude in allowed behavior and questioning than would
be given a defense attorney.”169
Yet it is my contention that a vast majority of indigent defendants, while
perhaps influenced by some of these motives, choose to go pro se because they
believe it is the only viable option to escape the pressure to plead, and the only
way to present a formidable defense. The story of Tyrone Jackson is indicative
of the situation faced by many indigent defendants who are forced to choose
between acquiescence to unsatisfactory indigent defense counsel and selfrepresentation.
A.

Inside the Mind of the Pro Se Defendant: Interview with Tyrone Jackson

Federal prosecutors indicted Tyrone Jackson on January 8, 2008, for
charges that, if convicted, could result in him spending the next 20 years to his
natural life in a federal penitentiary.170 Mr. Jackson was assigned a federal
public defender, who he considered to be a “nice guy” and who he conceded
was probably an “excellent attorney.”171 Yet Mr. Jackson opted for pro se
representation; largely because he felt his attorney failed to appreciate the
gravity of his situation.172 Admitting to having been arrested on an average of
four to five times a year, which he dismissed as commonplace for African–
American men where he comes from, this was by far the most serious charge
he ever faced.173
For Mr. Jackson, a lack of trust was at the heart of his decision to elect pro
se representation.174 He ultimately waived his right to counsel and elected to
represent himself, not because he felt he was more equipped to handle his case,
but rather, because he felt he had no choice in order to fairly present his case to
a jury.175 He did so in an attempt to circumvent the same old routine by which
indigent criminal defendants like him were convicted.176 Mr. Jackson referred

169. Douglas R. Morris & Richard L. Frierson, Pro Se Competence in the Aftermath of
Indiana v. Edwards, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW. 551, 553 (2008).
170. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1462 (2005) (footnote omitted):
For indigent defendants the development of robust communicative relationships with
counsel is difficult if not impossible. In overburdened state courts, it is not uncommon for
a defendant to meet his public defender, hear about the deal, and decide what to do—all in
the span of less than an hour and within the confines of a court lock-up or hallway while
waiting to go into court.
175. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
176. Id.
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to the criminal justice process as “a dance” in which everyone (the defense
attorney, prosecutor, and judge) knows the routine, except the defendant.177
So rather than allowing the prosecutor to present the “same case, with the
same witnesses . . . that he presented last week” and allowing an appointed
defense attorney to argue that another “black client with dreadlocks wasn’t a
drug dealer,” Mr. Jackson decided he had a better shot of convincing a jury of
his innocence if he conducted his own defense.178 In doing so, he hoped to
dispel any stereotypes jurors may have had about him because of his
appearance and implore them to consider his case as if they were in his shoes.
Yet not all indigent defendants exhibit this level of perseverance when facing
status quo, unsatisfactory representation and subsequent imprisonment. Many
lie down and accept their fate as decided by indigent defense counsel, who
does not necessarily have their best interests in mind.179
Mr. Jackson vehemently rejecting any sort of plea bargain. What
concerned him most was that his attorney never even asked him his side of the
story prior to advising him to plead guilty for a lesser sentence: “He never even
asked me if I was innocent or guilty.”180 According to Mr. Jackson, his
attorney’s attitude was, “They say that you did A, B, and C . . . that they [are]
gonna bring in Susie, Bobby, and Johnny, and that they’re all going to testify
to this.”181 This indicated to Mr. Jackson that his attorney “saw it the way they
[the prosecutors] see it.”182 Mr. Jackson recalled, “Well, when I started to tell
him I was innocent, the melancholy face come on . . . like ‘everybody tells me
So, according to Mr. Jackson, his attorney’s attitude was
this.’”183
177. Id. (“They have a system; it’s like a dance, and they all know the routine and I don’t.
He [the public defender] comes in, because he goes before this judge on a regular basis, and goes,
‘This is what I say, this is what you say, this is what the prosecutor says.’”) See, e.g., Frontline,
supra note 143. Indigent defendants feel pressure to plead out in a crowded courtroom when
represented by public defenders. Id. (“Everyone knows the answers to the questions and
everyone knows that if you answer the questions incorrectly, the whole thing will blow up and the
judge will yell at you and you might not get the bargain that you’re going to get.”).
178. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1976)
(“[I]t is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case
more effectively by conducting his own defense.”). For a discussion of the predicament face by
other indigent defendants, see Natapoff, supra note 174.
179. See Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 61, at 793 (describing why indigent
defendants might not contest inadequate or unfavorable representation).
180. See Interview with Flynn & Curran, supra note 131. It is ironic that this legal
construct—the attorney seeking to avoid suborning perjury—coupled with wanting to have the
option of putting the defendant on the stand actually favors the defendant’s interests. Unaware of
this, Mr. Jackson regards the fact that his attorney never asked him whether he was innocent or
guilty as a sign that he did not care about him, when, in fact, he was not asked in order to protect
him.
181. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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“basically . . . just plead out.”184 Uncompromising in professing his innocence,
Mr. Jackson decided he had to go pro se in order to “fight” for himself.185
Unlike most indigent defendants who routinely attempt to fire their
appointed attorneys prior to making the decision to go pro se,186 Mr. Jackson
dismissed the possibility of asking the court for another attorney.187 He
recognized that, in his situation, another appointed attorney would likely result
in the same level of dissatisfaction. When asked if he considered another
attorney, Mr. Jackson responded, “I thought about another lawyer, but I’m in
jail with 14–15 people in the cell that are complaining the same way about
their attorney that I am. Out of those people, maybe 3–4 different attorney
names came up, so we all had basically had the same attorney.”188 Rather than
look like a “pest,” Mr. Jackson opted for pro se representation.189
B.

Fundamental Distrust of Indigent Defense Counsel

Rodney Holmes, standby counsel for Mr. Jackson during his trial and a
highly respected criminal defense attorney, acknowledged that a vast majority
of criminal defendants realize their ineptness in formulating a defense for their
cases.190 Yet, he attributes the pro se willingness of some indigent defendants
to their “fundamental distrust” of the government.191 Mr. Holmes believes this
distrust derives from the greater presence that law enforcement officials
maintain in lower class areas, namely due to the correlative higher crimes
rates.192 He notes that those choosing to go pro se typically have greater
abilities—such as the ability to read and analyze cases. Does this make them
more equipped than lawyers with extensive legal training? Probably not. But
then why go pro se?193
Another source of distrust for appointed defense counsel is the indigent
defendants’ misunderstanding of the inner workings of the criminal justice
system. This culminates with the notion that everyone involved is working to

184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Hashimoto, supra note 10, at 429 (noting that nearly half of all pro se defendants in
the Federal Docketing Database sought the appointment of new counsel at least once prior to
making a motion to proceed pro se).
187. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Interview with Rodney Holmes, Criminal Defense Attorney (Standby counsel appointed
by the court for Tyrone Jackson), in Saint Louis, Mo. (Nov. 26, 2008).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. This is essentially the focal point of this Comment. Despite the recognition by many
indigent defendants regarding their ineptitude to conduct their defense, they are still willing to do
so because of the undesirable alternatives.
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“get them.” For all the shortcomings of indigent defense systems in the United
States, either in the form of public defender offices or private attorneys
retained by the courts, such lawyers are often competent and willing to
passionately advocate for indigent defendants’ rights. Further, courts have the
advantage of knowing competent attorneys in the area best-suited to handle
indigent defense cases. Yet the “bad apple” spoils the bunch adage applies to
evaluating indigent defense counsel as a whole. Even still, such defendants
may fail to grasp how a court-appointed attorney is not necessarily a public
defender,194 and many even refuse to recognize a public defender as an actual
attorney.195 The following displays the state of confusion that exists:
Indigents commonly mistrust the public defender assigned to them and view
him as part of the same court bureaucracy that is ‘processing’ and convicting
them. The lack of trust is a major obstacle to establishing an effective
attorney-client relationship. The problem was captured in a sad exchange
between a social science researcher and a prisoner: “Did you have a lawyer
196
when you went to court.” “No. I had a public defender.”

Another defendant at the federal courthouse in East St. Louis, Illinois,
during the summer of 2008 also chose to represent himself.197 Kevin Cooper,
who was facing federal drug trafficking charges, elected to go pro se after he
saw his court-appointed attorney laughing with the prosecutor prior to a
preliminary hearing for his trial.198 Mr. Cooper’s court-appointed counsel was
a former prosecutor-turned-defense attorney, and Mr. Cooper allegedly did not
trust him because of his prior work in the prosecutor’s office.199 This
perceived closeness between the prosecution and defense illustrates another
root of the distrust criminal defendants, particularly those familiar with the
system, may develop over time. It also shows the misunderstanding criminal
defendants have of the lawyer’s ethical obligations to his or her clients.
Mr. Cooper was likely influenced by his successful experience defending
himself against an ill-conceived attempted murder charge in state court several

194. Interview with Holmes, supra note 190. Mr. Holmes discussed other cases in which he
was appointed by the court to represent indigent criminal defendants. He noted that many of
them assumed because his services as appointed counsel came at no expense, he probably was not
a very good lawyer. In fact, he commands substantial fees from his private clients due to his
outstanding reputation as a criminal defense attorney.
195. Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 141, at 86.
196. Id. See also Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No.
I Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4 (1971)).
197. This is based on the author’s experience in the district court during the trial.
198. Interview with George Norwood, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern
District of Illinois, in Fairview Heights, Ill. (November 25, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with
Norwood].
199. Id.
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years prior to his federal drug case.200 Rather than resulting in a no-charge due
to self-defense, or at best, a charge of assault, prosecutors charged Mr. Cooper
with attempted murder.201 Mr. Cooper’s optimism following his original win
in state court also derives from the notion that widely-publicized incidents of
self-representation make pro se representation the popular thing to do.202 As
more and more indigent defendants choose self-representation, it is reasonably
foreseeable that an avalanche of pro se defendants will result from pro se fairy
tales disseminated through city streets and prison halls. To combat this, it
would behoove trial courts to take their waiver of counsel duties more
seriously in order to ward off the inevitable headaches from an onslaught of
indigent pro se defendants flooding their courtrooms.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Throughout this Comment, I have proposed several solutions aimed at
alleviating concerns of those wishing to see indigent criminal defendants
acquiesce to counsel, and believe that courts should respect the free will of
defendants opting self-representation. In addition, I believe every jurisdiction
should produce some sort of handbook for indigent defendants contemplating
self-representation, for example: “The Indigent Criminal Defendant Guide to
Choosing a Mode of Defense.” Much like a “Patient’s Bill of Rights” between
doctors and patients in the healthcare setting, this handbook would include a
document to be signed by both client and attorney, detailing what each expects
from the case. For instance, there may be a clause that reads, “As client, I am
entitled to provide my input into how my case should best be handled.” Or
even, from the lawyer’s standpoint, “I will do all in my power to fulfill the
wishes of you, my client, in zealously advocating your case.”
What will this proposed handbook accomplish? It is a simple document
which provides tangible peace of mind to those indigent defendants who feel
scorned, mistreated, or left out by the criminal justice system and/or skeptical
about the level of representation they will receive from indigent defense
counsel. For the lawyer, it will reiterate the codes of professional conduct
expected of them when representing their clients. For courts, it might
200. E-mail from Susan Gentle, Attorney at Law (Appointed standby counsel for Mr. Cooper)
(Nov. 18, 2008, 07:51:00 CST) (on file with author).
201. Interview with Norwood, supra note 198.
202. Such high profile cases include that of Zaccarias Moussaoui, the alleged “twentieth”
hijacker of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, who represented himself. Tom Jackman,
Moussaoui Allowed to Defend Himself, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at A1; see also Josh White,
Muhammad Takes Over His Own Defense; Judge Advises Against Move, Then Allows It, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 2003, at A1 (documenting Washington, D.C. sniper, John Allen Muhammad’s
initial decision to represent himself during his trial). Interview with Norwood, supra note 198
(noting that after Tyrone Jackson’s trial, another defendant, who was an acquaintance of Jackson,
opted to elect pro se representation).
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minimize the number of indigent defendants choosing self-representation by
furthering the appearance of justice being served in our system.
Another proposal stems from the idea that indigent defendants should have
the right to retain counsel with attorneys when they have established trust from
prior cases.203 Building on this notion, indigent defendants should be
presented with a biographical array of five indigent defense attorneys at the
outset of their case. After allowing the defendant to analyze each prospective
attorney’s qualifications, experience, and prior case handlings, he or she may
list an order of preferences for the five attorneys. Based on availability of
those five, the court may make a good-faith effort to fulfill the defendant’s first
choice, second choice, and so forth. At a minimum, this will instill trust in the
indigent defendant’s mind that he has at least some say in who represents him.
This may diminish the feelings of resentment toward indigent defense counsel
that result when a court says, “This is your attorney, take it or leave it.”
Similar such proposals have faced staunch resistance, with those in
opposition citing the fear that defendants familiar with the system will
monopolize the most competent attorneys. Perhaps this possibility should not
be dismissed as a problem, but should serve as a case study for how those
attorneys interact with their indigent clients in order to gain their trust. The
time has come for innovation in the way we dole out indigent defense counsel.
When I proposed this idea and stated the common oppositions to Mr. Jackson,
he noted, “there’s something right about” those attorneys who indigent
defendants prefer, and “maybe [we] need to figure out what’s right with
them.”204 Taking it a step further, perhaps an incentive system should reward
attorneys who foster faith from their indigent clients in order to encourage
others to act with the same benevolence. This sort of program, if implemented
properly, may pave the way for the sort of meaningful relationship in line with
the rallying call by Justice Scalia in Gonzalez–Lopez.205 Over time, such a
bold and, admittedly, difficult-to-implement initiative may begin to dissuade
would-be indigent pro se defendants from rejecting the assistance of counsel.
During my interview with Mr. Jackson, I spent over two hours talking with
him about his plight. Most indigent defense attorneys, strapped by time
constraints, do not have that luxury. Mr. Jackson did not know me before our
meeting, but I could tell that after talking for a while, he became more and
more comfortable. Whether he trusted me, however, I cannot be sure. But I
could tell that he appreciated the opportunity to sit down with someone and tell
his story. Perhaps providing more law students the opportunity to assist in
indigent representation would diminish feelings of despair felt by indigent
defendants like Mr. Jackson. Allowing law students to assist on a larger scale
203. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 528.
204. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.
205. United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006).
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may convey that at least someone is willing to sit down with them and discuss
their case. That does not seem like too much to ask.
CONCLUSION
For anything to change the way indigent criminal defendants are treated by
our justice system or to alleviate their perceptions of unfairness, however
misguided, there must be a whirlwind recognition of the importance of the
right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal proceedings. Policy
makers and legislatures, motivated by the whims of their constituencies, likely
will not bring about change in the way indigent criminal defendants are treated,
either in perception or reality. Because of this, the courts must take the
initiative, acting as a parent advising their child with regard to certain courses
of action, and providing them with all the necessary information to make an
intelligent decision as best they can. Few in the legal profession can relate to
the plight faced by indigent criminal defendants. Yet I hope that most can now
understand the reaction by those defendants who feel scorned by the system,
turn their back to the assistance of appointed counsel, and choose selfrepresentation.
MARK C. MILTON
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